

# Report of the Independent Observer

## Annex 2: Assessment of Completed and Remaining Actions in the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Resulting from the Algiers Process

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THE  
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## ANNEX 2: ASSESSMENT OF COMPLETED AND REMAINING ACTIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

<b>Legend:</b>	completed actions
interim and preliminary measures : IP	ongoing actions
long-term and core provisions : P	remaining actions

IP / P	Provisions of the Agreement	Measures Taken to Implement	Observations
<b>Political and Institutional Issues</b>			
<b>Interim Political and Institutional Measures</b>			
IP	Establish and stand up the interim authorities at the regional, <i>cercle</i> , and local level in the five northern regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Texts adopted.</li> <li>• Interim Authority designated and established in all regions except in the <i>cercles</i> of Al-Ourche, Boujbeha, and Foum-Elba in the Taoudeni region.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The interim authorities are poorly supplied and barely functional. They lack human, material, and financial resources. National institutions insufficiently engage with them in order to fulfill their missions as defined in the texts.</li> <li>• At this stage of implementation of the agreement, they should be advantageously contributing to the preparation of elections, and the establishment of <i>collectivités territoriales</i>' bodies.</li> <li>• Appointing interim authorities in all <i>cercles</i> and municipalities of the Taoudeni region must be rapidly carried out so that they play their part, particularly to prepare for the upcoming local elections.</li> </ul>
<b>Establish a New Institutional Framework and Territorial Reorganization</b>			
P	Enhance representation of populations in the National Assembly by increasing the number of electoral districts and/or any other appropriate measures.		Revise Organic Law 02-010 establishing the conditions of eligibility and the number of members of the National Assembly, taking into account the new regions of Taoudeni and Menaka and the <i>cercles</i> of Achibogho and Almoustarat.

P	Open the High Council of the <i>Collectivités Territoriales</i> to representatives of traditional leaders, women, and young people.		This commitment was inscribed as early as 2015 in the government's action plan and the CSA timeline. However, the measure was not completed and was replaced with the commitment to integrate representatives of traditional leaders, women, and young people within the Senate when it is created in the future.
P	Improve the representation of northern populations in institutions and major public services, bodies, and administrations of the republic.		According to the government, this commitment is being progressively implemented as needs and opportunities present themselves. Its implementation should be accelerated to comply with the agreement.
P	Create the second chamber of parliament under the name of Senate, Council of the Nation, or any other name that emphasizes its nature and role. Its mission and composition should promote the objectives of the agreement.	Two unsuccessful attempts to revise the constitution took place in 2017 and 2019.	Reforming the constitution was again recommended during the National Inclusive Dialogue (2019).
P	Complete the redistricting process in order to enhance the representation of northern populations and enable them to effectively manage their own affairs based on the principle of free administration.		Territorial reorganization via administrative redistricting is currently localized in the new regions of Menaka and Taoudeni.
P	Create and stand up the regions of Menaka and Taoudeni, as well as the cercles of Almoustarat and Achibogho.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Texts creating the <i>collectivités territoriales</i> adopted.</li> <li>• Governors and interim authorities established at the regional level.</li> </ul>	<p>This process is progressing very slowly. Facilities in Taoudéni and in both new <i>cercles</i> are nonexistent. Financial and human resources to implement the missions are lacking.</p> <p>Institutional support and legislative progress are required to organize an effective transfer of power and services to local bodies, in accordance with provisions of the agreement.</p>
P	Create administrative districts in order to hold legislative elections in the Menaka and Taoudeni regions, as well as in the <i>cercles</i> of Almoustarat and Achibogho.		Administrative redistricting must be carried out and legislative texts expeditiously adapted in order to create electoral districts and organize the upcoming legislative and local elections.
IP	Hold elections at the local, regional, and national levels and establish the elected bodies as laid out the agreement.		Revise the Electoral Law and make all necessary preparatory steps a matter of priority to ensure the local, regional, and national elections are held and to establish the bodies provided for in the agreement.
<b>Decentralization: Institutional Framework, Distribution of Powers and Administrative Responsibilities between the Central Government and Local Authorities</b>			

P	<p>Reform the processes for decentralization, territorial administration, and local elections in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a Regional Assembly and a president elected by popular vote;</li> <li>• <i>Cercles</i> and municipalities with legislative bodies elected by popular vote and equipped with executive powers;</li> <li>• A new distribution of administrative responsibilities between the government and the <i>collectivités territoriales</i>.</li> </ul>	<p>Fundamental texts adopted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Code of the <i>collectivités territoriales</i>;</li> <li>• Texts relating to the public service and general public function of the <i>collectivités territoriales</i>;</li> <li>• Other legislative and regulatory texts adopted that establish and organize the new administrative responsibilities of the <i>collectivités territoriales</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2015, the CSA subcommittee responsible for political and institutional issues created an exhaustive list of texts to be developed or reviewed in order to align them with the provisions of the agreement on the distribution of administrative responsibilities and powers between the State and the <i>collectivités territoriales</i>.</li> <li>• The Code of the <i>Collectivités Territoriales</i> must be expeditiously reviewed in order to achieve these measures. The Signatory Parties committed to do so in the roadmap adopted in March 2018, which remains valid today.</li> </ul>
P	Establish and stand up the <i>collectivités territoriales</i> .		The Independent Observer recommends an expeditious review of the texts required to stand up the new bodies and ensure administrative responsibilities are transferred in conformation with the provisions of the agreement.
P	Establish and put in place procedures for consultations between the government and the regions on development projects decided by the government and public or private bodies, and the exploitation of natural resources, particularly mining.		The texts have yet to be adopted, and the measures are yet to be implemented.
<b>Decentralization: Government Representation and Legal Oversight</b>			
IP	<p>Adopt the legislative and regulatory texts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law on free [locally-based] administration of the <i>collectivités territoriales</i>.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The law on free [locally based] administration must be expeditiously reviewed in order to achieve these measures. The Signatory Parties made this commitment in the roadmap adopted in March 2018 and it remains valid today.</li> <li>• The Independent Observer recommends an expeditious review of the texts required to stand up the new bodies and ensure administrative responsibilities are transferred to conform with the provisions of the agreement.</li> </ul>
P	Appoint the representative of the state in the <i>collectivités territoriales</i> , whose duties are aligned with the provisions defined in the agreement.		The texts have yet to be adopted and the measures are yet to be implemented.
<b>Decentralization: Funding and Resources of the <i>Collectivités Territoriales</i></b>			

P	Transfer 30% of the government's revenue to the <i>collectivités territoriales</i> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Texts adopted establishing the procedures and mechanisms for the transfer of 30% of the government's revenue to the <i>collectivités territoriales</i>.</li> <li>• Action plan created to transfer 30% of government revenue.</li> <li>• Decree written and signed on the procedures to transfer decentralized services.</li> <li>• Texts adopted establishing the procedures and mechanisms to retrocede to the <i>collectivités territoriales</i> a percentage of the revenue earned from natural resource exploitation in their territory (see Law on Free Administration of the <i>Collectivités Territoriales</i>).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The complete and verified application of adopted texts is still pending.</li> <li>• According to information from the government, this action initiated in 2018 enabled the transfer of 21% of state revenue annually.</li> </ul>
IP	Adopt texts enabling the <i>collectivités territoriales</i> to set the tax rates, fees, and taxes in the areas of expertise recognized by the agreement, and to set taxes appropriate for their respective economic situations and development objectives.		The Independent Observer recommends an expeditious review of the texts required to stand up the new bodies and ensure administrative responsibilities are transferred in conformation with the provisions of the agreement.
P	Retrocede revenue from the exploitation of natural resources to the respective <i>collectivités territoriales</i> .		The texts have yet to be adopted and the measures have yet to be implemented.
P	Transfer decentralized services to the <i>collectivités territoriales</i> .		The Independent Observer recommends an expeditious review of the texts required to stand up the new bodies and ensure administrative responsibilities are transferred in conformation with the provisions of the agreement.
<b>DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES</b>			
<b>Interim Security Measures</b>			
<b>Effective participation of the representatives of the Signatory Parties in the Technical Security Committee (CTS) and in the Joint Observation and Verification Teams (EMOVs)</b>			
IP	Set up the CTS and EMOVs with more members and expanded representation.	The CTS and EMOVs have been set up and are operational.	The CTS is operational, and all parties participate in its activities. It plays the important role of monitoring the implementation of security arrangements and supports the parties in the development of the DDR process.

IP	Effective implementation of security arrangements by the parties.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing ceasefire monitoring operations and investigations are undertaken by EMOVs available on the ground.</li> <li>• Arrangements were made, resulting from the Ouagadougou Agreement.</li> <li>• Security Arrangements for the Cessation of Hostilities were adopted on June 5, 2015, in Algiers and are regularly updated by the CTS. The most recent update was made on September 25, 2019.</li> </ul>	
P	Durable cessation of hostilities between the parties.	Fighting between the government and the Signatory Movements has sustainably ended.	Although hostilities have ended between the government and the Movements, fighting among the Movements in the northern regions has marked the period since the agreement's signature. There have also been internal confrontations within the Movements (in Talataye, Inchinanene, Lerneb, etc.).
<b>Establishment of the Operational Coordination Mechanism (MOC) and Joint Patrols</b>			
IP	Establish the MOC.	MOC units were assembled and established in 2017 in Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu.	The MOC command structure has been established and members of the units assembled, but the MOC hasn't been made operational for its missions, as provided for in the agreement.
IP	Plan and carrying out joint patrols (operational procedures and schedule defined by zone), with, if necessary and possible, the support of MINUSMA and the international forces in attendance.	Initiatives have been taken to plan and carry out joint patrols.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• These initiatives have not been achieved.</li> <li>• The only joint patrol experiment undertaken in Gao in 2017 had to be stopped after the terrorist attack on the MOC of Gao.</li> </ul>
IP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effectively carry out joint patrols in the designated zones.</li> <li>• Effectively provide security for the cantonment process, coordinate all actions and movements of the combatants, and provide security for the population.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No joint patrols have taken place to secure cantonment sites or to secure populations after the Gao MOC was attacked.</li> <li>• The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and international forces are filling the security vacuum that the MOC was tasked to fill.</li> </ul>
IP	The CTS and MOC shall present an implementation plan for security arrangements in Northern Mali, in which joint patrols shall have a key role in providing security for the cantonment and demobilization process.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CTS plays a monitoring role in the implementation of the security arrangements.</li> <li>• As the cantonment process and the conduct of patrols are no longer on the agenda, the CTS remains in charge of monitoring security arrangements, the DDR process, and other related initiatives.</li> </ul>

Cantonment, DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and Integration			
IP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Define cantonment procedures, standards, and practices with the support of MINUSMA.</li> <li>The CTS and MINUSMA should identify, validate, and build cantonment sites.</li> <li>Update the operating method of cantonment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The texts defining the criteria for combatants and their weapons have been adopted.</li> <li>Cantonment sites have been identified.</li> <li>Eight cantonment sites have been built by MINUSMA.</li> </ul>	The sites have been built but most of them have been abandoned because of insecurity and delays in the DDR process. Updated procedures for the comprehensive DDR are awaited.
IP	Establish and stand up the CN-DDR.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decree No. 2015-0894/P-RM was adopted on Dec. 31, 2015, establishing the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (CN-DDR) and defining its organisation and operating methods.</li> <li>An inclusive national DDR program and timetable was adopted.</li> <li>A national DDR strategy and strategic plan was adopted.</li> </ul>	
IP	Supply to the CN-DDR official lists of combatants and their weapons.	The National Commission-DDR (CN-DDR) finalized the official list.	The CN-DDR completed the list instead of the CTS, to whom the task was assigned in the agreement. A total of 81,981 combatants are registered. The lists are not definitive yet. The Signatory Parties did not certify the list, as stipulated in the agreement, in order to create an official database. As a result, for each operation requiring combatants, the Movements must be called upon to certify the lists, resulting in delays.
IP	The Movements must submit to the CTS the final and certified list of their combatants and weapons.		The Movements have not yet submitted the official list to the CTS for certification (see above).
IP	Regroup combatants from the Movements and assign them to cantonment sites for the purpose of DDR operations.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cantonment (regroupment of combatants) on the cantonment sites, initially planned as a first step to implement the DDR and integration process, seems to be abandoned.</li> <li>In this context, the CTS has not made any progress to set an effective start date for the cantonment process.</li> <li>The March 2018 roadmap projected deadlines for cantonment that remain unmet. The unfavorable security context for the cantonment of so many people, particularly the risk of terrorist attacks, is put forward as the main reason for this.</li> </ul>

IP	Determine and select combatants eligible for integration or for the DDR process.		The March 2018 roadmap projected deadlines for cantonment that remain unmet.
IP	Undertake DDR for all ex-combatants according to the determined schedule and based upon the validated list of combatants.	So far, only ex-combatants of MOC units have participated in the accelerated DDR process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A lack of consensus among the parties on the reconstituted army's composition impeded setting up and launching the comprehensive DDR process.</li> <li>• Beyond the accelerated DDR process, the comprehensive DDR process must be launched and advanced.</li> <li>• To implement the agreement, it will be important to determine quotas before adopting the next Military Orientation and Programming Law (LOPM).</li> </ul>
IP	Establish the National Commission for Integration (CNI) and adopt related legislative and regulatory texts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decree No. 2015-0895/P-RM was adopted on Dec. 31, 2015, created, organized and set up working methods of the National Commission-Integration (CNI).</li> <li>• Decree No. 2019-0874-P-RM, establishing the modalities for rank allocations, command posts and reclassification of ex-combatants, was adopted on Oct. 30, 2019.</li> <li>• Decree No. 2019-0184/P-RM was adopted on March 5, 2019, and set the criteria for the integration of ex-combatants of the Signatory Movements into public services and institutions, including the Armed and Security Forces.</li> </ul>	
P	Reintegrate ex-combatants who are former members of the FAMa.	668 ex-combatants who were former members of the FAMa have been reintegrated.	
P	Integrate ex-combatants into the defense and security forces.	A first phase of integration is ongoing as part of the accelerated DDR process (see below).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beyond the accelerated DDR process, actions must be carried out to implement this provision.</li> <li>• The texts on quotas have not yet been adopted.</li> <li>• Despite adopting the decree on the criteria for the integration of ex-combatants, the issues of quotas and the representation of the different parties is not addressed by the decree. The parties' views differ on this issue.</li> <li>• The parties need to agree on quotas of ex-combatants to be integrated, as well as the size, representation, and missions of the new reconstituted defense and security forces.</li> </ul>

P	Partial, accelerated DDR.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MOC elements eligible for integration, cantonment, and training have been identified.</li> <li>• In December 2019, the first phase of accelerated DDR was formally finalized.</li> <li>• The accelerated DDR process integrated 1,325 ex-combatants and MOC elements.</li> <li>• The catch-up phase (<i>rattrapage</i>) of the accelerated DDR process to reach 1,840 integrated elements continues.</li> <li>• The government has taken measures and combatants have been integrated into the Defense and Security Forces under the supervision of the National Commission for Integration and the National Council for the RSS.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The integration of combatants from the Movements has so far been limited to the integration of ex-combatants involved in the MOC, limited to 1,840 persons.</li> <li>• U.N. Security Council Resolution 2531 (June 2020) urges the parties to "achieve significant results towards the completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the signatory armed groups and in the operationalization of the reconstituted, reformed and inclusive Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF), notably by vetting, integrating in the MDSF and training at least 2,000 members of the signatory armed groups, in addition to the already integrated ones, redeploying all the integrated elements who underwent the accelerated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process to the North following appropriate consultations between Malian parties with regards to the composition of the reconstituted units, and entrusting these units with concrete tasks, such as patrols."</li> </ul>
P	Socioeconomic reinsertion of ex-combatants who will not be integrated in the FDS or civil service.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The socioeconomic reinsertion of ex-combatants has not yet begun.</li> <li>• The financial and technical partners (PTFs) (World Bank, etc.) have made funds available to support this program, but the parties still disagree.</li> </ul>
<b>Redeployment of the Reconstituted Army</b>			
IP	Implement a detailed plan and timetable for the redeployment of reconstituted armed and security forces in northern Mali, taking into account the environment, threats, and security needs.	The timetable and plan of redeployment of the first reconstituted units as part of the accelerated DDR process was presented to the CTS by the FAMa military staff.	Concrete actions still need to be carried out to implement this provision.

P	<p>Gradually redeploy the reconstituted defense and security forces under the command of the MOC and with the support of MINUSMA, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrating appropriate representation of northern populations, including in the command structure.</li> <li>• Taking into account the need to protect the populations, defend territorial integrity, secure borders, and fight terrorism.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Redeployment began as part of the partial accelerated DDR initiative.</li> <li>• The government has equipped and taken charge of the first reconstituted units.</li> <li>• Reconstituted units have been assigned to Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Menaka.</li> <li>• These reconstituted units include significant northern representation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the absence of a comprehensive plan agreed upon by the parties, the redeployment process began with the training and assignment of the first reconstituted units of ex-combatants absorbed by the accelerated DDR process.</li> <li>• Reconstituted units are still redeploying and not always involved in missions to secure or protect the populations yet.</li> <li>• This redeployment cannot cover all the northern regions because of a lack of manpower.</li> <li>• Even if these reconstituted units include significant northern representation, the issue of command remains.</li> <li>• The redeployment of the reconstituted forces has not yet been meaningfully carried out and awaits the comprehensive DDR processes.</li> </ul>
<b>Reorganization of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) / Security Sector Reform (RSS)</b>			
IP	<p>Establish structures to adopt the security sector reform and plan to reorganize the defense and security forces.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decree No. 2016-0401/P-RM, adopted on June 9, 2016, created the National Council for the Reform of the Security Sector, was revised.</li> <li>• The RSS commission and secretariat were established in 2019.</li> <li>• Legislative and regulatory texts for security sector reform were adopted.</li> <li>• Detailed evaluation of the defense and security system took place.</li> <li>• High-level workshops were organized on security sector reform, including on territorial police, in March and December 2018.</li> <li>• Work to harmonize visions on the concept of the reconstituted army took place, including the Special Units Battalion (BUS).</li> <li>• National Strategy for Security Sector Reform was adopted.</li> </ul>	<p>Despite much work in this area, the parties have still not been able to agree on an architecture for the reconstituted army nor on the step-by-step process to reform the reorganization of the armed and security forces. Despite the existing texts, the blockages persist and hinder the reform, such as the unresolved issue of representation in the command of the reconstituted army.</p>

P	Finalize decisions concerning the in-depth reform of the security sector through the adoption of the National RSS Strategy in accordance with the objectives pursued, including the definition of the responsibilities and missions of the different bodies in the security sector and taking into account the diversity of geographical areas.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level consultation workshops were organized in March and December 2018.</li> <li>• The National Strategy for Security Sector Reform was adopted.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Despite the measures taken, the parties continue to disagree on the concept of the reconstituted army and the operating procedures. Expeditious action to establish a common vision and decisions is needed to achieve progress.</li> <li>• The Movements, as well as other analysts, believe that the National RSS Strategy does not take into account the pertinent provisions of the agreement.</li> </ul>
P	The National Council for RSS should present recommendations on innovative mechanisms for integration of ex-combatants in high command and services in order to strengthen national cohesion.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The parties are now working to integrate ex-combatants into the army in operational units up to the battalion level.</li> <li>• The National Council has not yet proposed recommendations for proceeding to integration of ex-combatants to high command positions.</li> <li>• The integration of senior officers remains a stumbling block.</li> </ul>
P	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The government, with the assistance of international partners, should establish defense and security institutions enable to meet the country's security needs and contributing to the promotion of regional security.</li> <li>• Strengthen the control and supervision of the defense and security forces and promote respect for the rule of law.</li> </ul>	International partners support the training of the security and defense forces, including through the EU Training Mission (EUTM), EUCAP (on security forces and justice), and MINUSMA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The mandate of the European Union EUTM mission has been extended and expanded to continue to meet training and support needs.</li> <li>• Several reports have indicated repeated human rights violations by the security and defense forces during counter-terrorism operations.</li> <li>• International partners, notably MINUSMA, are attempting to address these issues. Measures are expected in order to achieve concrete progress.</li> </ul>
<b>Counter-terrorism</b>			
P	Establish, as needed, special units to counter violent extremism and transnational organized crime.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Special Units Battalion (BUS) was created as a dedicated counter-terrorism force.</li> <li>• One batallion was deployed in missions in Gao and Menaka regions, but is still not fully stood up.</li> <li>• Training and progressive redeployment of the new units is ongoing to complete the batallion.</li> <li>• Three trainings took place in Gao and Sevaré.</li> </ul>	
<b>Establishment of the Territorial Police</b>			

P	Create and stand up the territorial police.	The Council of Ministers adopted draft legislation on territorial police and the decree on territorial police in March 2020.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The draft legislation on territorial police was not submitted to the National Assembly before the Transition.</li> <li>• No steps toward implementation have yet been taken.</li> </ul>
P	Train and deploy the first units of the territorial police, starting in the regions' capitals.		The July 2019 roadmap provided for the deployment of the first units of the territorial police in October 2019, starting with regions' capitals. The process to stand-up the new territorial police has not yet begun.
<b>Establishment of Local Security Advisory Committees (CCLS)</b>			
P	Establish local Security Advisory Committees (CCLS), bringing together representatives from the state, regional and local authorities, communities, and traditional authorities under the authority of the head of local elected bodies.		The CCLS have not been addressed in the process of implementation. Legislation and regulations have not yet been adopted. The CCLS are not yet operational.
<b>SOCIOECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT</b>			
<b>Emergency Measures for the Benefit of the Population of Northern Regions</b>			
P	Implement a Humanitarian Emergency Plan (PURD).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The PURD was carried out from 2015-2017, including presentation of the plan and the mobilization of resources by the government.</li> <li>• The government presented its assessment.</li> </ul>	This emergency plan, agreed upon by the parties and intended to be a first measure to restore confidence by delivering a peace dividend with the return of basic social services, has not been sufficiently implemented. The return of basic social services continues to be an acute issue in the northern regions.
P	Reestablish basic social services in all localities in northern Mali, including health, education, water, and revitalization of local economy.		Meetings, action plans, and a mapping of social services in the north have been undertaken, but has so far resulted in few concrete actions.
<b>Specific Development Strategy</b>			
IP	Lead a Joint Evaluation Mission in Northern Mali (MIEC).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The MIEC was conducted.</li> <li>• A report on the MIEC was presented.</li> </ul>	
P	Develop a Specific Development Strategy for the northern regions.	The Specific Development Strategy for the Northern Regions of Mali (SSD/RN) has been developed and validated by the Signatory Parties.	The strategy has not yet been launched nor implemented.
<b>Northern Regions Development Zone</b>			

P	Stand up the Development Zone of the Northern regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Development Zone of the Northern regions was created.</li> <li>• The Interregional Consultative Council for Mali's Development Zone of the Northern regions was created by the Ministry of Finance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Movements reject the Interregional Consultative Council in its current set-up. According to the government, this body was created by the Ministry of Finance as a provisional structure, and the one stipulated in the agreement is not yet set up.</li> <li>• The operationalization of the Development Zone of the Northern regions is closely related to the establishment of the regional assemblies. These representatives will make up an Interregional Consultative Council that will ensure the coordination of the development zone.</li> <li>• See below on the Sustainable Development Fund (FDD).</li> </ul>
P	Establish and stand up the Interregional Consultative Council, which will coordinate efforts and resources in order to accelerate local socioeconomic development and related questions of the development zone. The ICC shall also monitor the implementation of the development zone, supported by the competent authorities and institutions.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Interregional Consultative Council, as provided for in the agreement, has yet to be established (see observation above).</li> <li>• Stand up of the council largely depends on progress made toward decentralization and the establishment of executive bodies in the regions, in accordance with the agreement.</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainable Development Fund (FDD)</b>			
IP	Organize a fundraising conference to establish the FDD, which will serve as a funding tool for the Specific Development Strategy.	The Paris Conference was organized and held in 20	Reports from the Ministry of Finance show that 98% of the funds pledged by the partners at the Paris Conference have been provided. However, the government's analyses and the reports of the Independent Observer show that these funds have gone, for the most part, to projects already underway and not to the immediate implementation of the agreement.
P	Create and organize the Sustainable Development Fund, including an operative working framework.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Texts adopted.</li> <li>• Funds allocated to the FDD.</li> <li>• The Steering and Management Committees have been set up and operationalized.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Today, the FDD has only been allocated FCFA 48.3 billion, which is far less than the needs identified in the Specific Development Strategy.</li> <li>• There are still differing views between the government and the Movements on the ideal composition of the Steering and Management Committees.</li> </ul>
P	The FDD funds projects in the northern regions, making sure that the projects are in line with the Specific Development Strategy for Northern Mali.		
<b>Mobilization for the Development of Northern Regions</b>			

IP	Set up Regional Development Agencies (ADR).	ADRs have been created in all regions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the regions of Menaka and Taoudeni, the ADRs operate from Gao and Timbuktu, respectively, due to their poor infrastructure and operating mechanisms.</li> <li>• The ADRs have not yet been placed under the authority of the Regional Assembly's president, to whom they are accountable (according to the provisions of the agreement).</li> </ul>
IP	Sign State/Regional Plan Contracts (CPR).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contracts signed for the regions of Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao.</li> <li>• Contracts pending for the regions of Taoudeni and Menaka.</li> </ul>	State/Regional Plan Contracts have yet to be signed for the regions of Taoudeni and Menaka.
P	The <i>collectivités territoriales</i> should mobilize and use local mining revenue and subsidies.		No progress were made on this issue.
P	Promote local cross-border cooperation projects.		No concrete action has been undertaken in this field, though cross-border and peripheral areas are identified as high-priority zones to implement projects, including by the Sahel Alliance.
<b>Develop Education and Culture in the Northern Regions</b>			
P	Adapt teaching programmes to the sociocultural situation in the regions.		The regulation and framework's documents have not been adopted and the measures have not been implemented.
P	Create institutions of higher education.		The infrastructure has yet to be built and made functional.
P	Strengthen the primary and secondary education system, paying particular attention to education for all.		Strategies and measures have yet to be defined and implemented.
P	Promote the cultures of northern regions at the local, national, and international level.		Strategies and measures have yet to be defined and implemented.
P	Build and operationalize: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher-education institutions</li> <li>• Regional cultural centers and museums</li> </ul>		The infrastructure has yet to be built and made functional.
<b>RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE, AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES</b>			
<b>Conference on National Understanding and Adoption of the National Charter</b>			

P	Organize the Conference for National Understanding.	Organized over five days in Bamako from March 27 to April 2, 2017.	The conference brought together more than 1,000 Malian stakeholders, including from opposition parties, signatory armed groups, and women and youth representatives. The conference resulted in a set of recommendations, which will inform the charter for peace, unity, and national reconciliation envisaged in the agreement. The CMA rejected the conclusion that the term "Azawad" remained a sociocultural and symbolic reality but carried no political status.
P	Develop the Charter for Peace, Unity, and National Reconciliation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Two inclusive working groups mapped Malian local histories and cultures.</li> <li>• The charter was drafted and adopted in June 2017.</li> <li>• The Law on National Understanding was passed on July 24, 2019, but was contested by part of civil society.</li> <li>• The decree implementing the Law on National Understanding is still pending.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The parties did not validate the draft charter before its adoption by the president of the republic.</li> <li>• The Signatory Movements rejected certain aspects of the charter.</li> <li>• Among the actions to be carried out, the March 2018 roadmap included "to complete the process of the Conference on National Understanding." This task has not yet been completed.</li> </ul>
<b>Fight against Financial Crime</b>			
P	Establish and stand up a commission to fight against corruption and financial crime.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law No 2014/015-P-RM on the prevention and repression of illicit enrichment was enacted on May 27, 2014.</li> <li>• A structure called "Central Office to Combat Illicit Enrichment" has existed since 2015. Established by the "Ordinance" of Sept. 23, 2015.</li> <li>• Decree No 2015-07 19/P-RM on the Organization and Operating Modalities of the Office to Fight Illicit Enrichment was adopted on Nov. 9, 2019.</li> </ul>	The role foreseen for this office in the agreement has been entrusted to the Central Office to Combat Illicit Enrichment.
<b>Fight against Crimes and Serious Violations of International Law</b>			
IP	Establish an International Commission of Enquiry to investigate serious human rights violations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The commission was established on Jan. 19, 2018, by the United Nations.</li> <li>• Mission carried out between March 2018 and June 2020.</li> </ul>	The commission has completed its mandate and submitted its report to the secretary-general of the United Nations. The report has not yet been made public.
<b>Creation of Transitional Justice Mechanisms</b>			

IP	Establish transitional justice mechanisms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) was functionally put in place.</li> <li>• Policy and programming texts were adopted.</li> <li>• A national policy on transitional justice was adopted by the Council of Ministers in January 2017 and presented to the National Assembly.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The national policy on transitional justice made it possible to stand up the CVJR, collect depositions, and organize public hearings.</li> <li>• The CVJR drafted the national policy on reparations. It awaits approval from the National Transition Council.</li> </ul>
IP	Operationalize the CVJR.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CVJR was opened up to include the Movements and civil society.</li> <li>• Branches of the CVJR were established throughout Mali in order to gather victims' depositions.</li> <li>• Document on the CVJR's intervention strategy (2016-18) and an action plan were developed.</li> <li>• Victims' depositions collected (18,499 files through November 2020).</li> <li>• Public hearings were held to listen to key witness testimony.</li> </ul>	
P	Fight against impunity: no amnesty for perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious human rights violations, including violence against women, girls, and children, related to the conflict.	The Law of National Understanding was voted and approved in 2019.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Law of National Understanding has been strongly criticized by civil society organizations, particularly human rights organizations.</li> <li>• The decree implementing this law has not yet been issued.</li> </ul>
<b>In-depth Reform of the Justice System to Ensure Improved Access to Justice</b>			
P	Commit to implement an in-depth reform of the justice system to ensure better access to justice, improve its efficiency, put an end to impunity, and integrate traditional and customary mechanisms without prejudice to the state's sovereign law in this area.	An emergency program was adopted to strengthen the justice system and the implementation of the agreement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report on the implementation of the program has not yet been submitted to the CSA.</li> <li>• The objective of this program was to improve Mali's justice system by consolidating the judiciary and the rule of law, as envisaged by the agreement. The results, announced several times by the government and requested by the CSA subcommittee in charge of Title V of the agreement, are still awaited.</li> </ul>

P	Consolidate the justice system to ensure the rule of law across the country.	Rehabilitation or reconstruction of several facilities within the justice system (courts, police stations, etc.) in the northern regions.	Judicial authorities are under threat from terrorist groups. Some were forced to abandon their posts; others refused to take office after being assigned to the north. In other places, judges have become overwhelmed with backlogged cases or remain inaccessible to litigants because of the need to travel great distances. Strengthening justice systems in the northern region is a priority.
P	Provide widespread legal and judicial assistance on the basis of existing texts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The national strategy for legal and judicial assistance, covering the period 2015-2020, has been adopted.</li> <li>Efforts were made to make legal aid more accessible through the practice of the provisions set out in the various existing texts.</li> </ul>	The national strategy for legal and judicial assistance, covering the period 2015-2020, has not been implemented because of a lack of will. Development partners are working on a smaller scale in the legal aid sector. NGOs work mainly in the area of citizens' rights.
<b>Enhancement of the Role of <i>Cadis</i> in the Delivery of Justice</b>			
P	Enhance the role of <i>cadis</i> in the delivery of justice, particularly with respect to civil mediation, in order to take into account cultural, religious, and customary specificities.	Draft legislation to enhance the role of <i>cadis</i> in delivering justice was presented in 2020 to the CSA Subcommittee on Title V.	To date, there have been no follow-up actions after this presentation.
P	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stand up the supervised practice of <i>cadis</i> in the delivery of justice.</li> <li>Promote quality training for all actors and officials of the justice system, including the <i>cadis</i>.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Its operationalization requires the adoption of the law and its application.</li> <li>An efficient training system has yet to be put in place.</li> <li>The role of <i>cadis</i>, once limited to the delivery of a certain form of justice, now extends de facto to criminal matters in certain areas, particularly in Kidal and other localities in the Timbuktu, Gao, Menaka, and Taoudeni regions.</li> </ul>
<b>Improve the Role of Traditional Authorities</b>			
P	Improve the status of traditional authorities by providing them with support and considering them when planning protocol.	The draft bill on the enhancement of the role of <i>cadis</i> in the delivery of justice was presented to the Justice and Reconciliation Subcommittee in 2020, taking into consideration the status of traditional authorities.	To date, there have been no follow-up actions after this presentation.
<b>Facilitating the Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees</b>			

IP	Create the necessary conditions to facilitate the rapid return, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement of all displaced persons and refugees and put in place the necessary assistance and care systems.	Three conventions for the return of refugees have been signed between Mali, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and each host country respectively (Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The deterioration of the security situation in the northern regions and the absence of state authority and basic social services do not favor their return.</li> <li>• There is no working mechanism to support the reintegration and rapid rehabilitation of displaced persons and refugees.</li> </ul>
IP	Render 27 sites viable to receive refugees and displaced persons.	The sites have not been developed.	It remains difficult to develop these sites under current security conditions.